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THE FORUM
Sites of Knowledge (Re-)Production: Toward
an Institutional Sociology of International
Relations Scholarship
FE´LIX GRENIER
Universite´ De Moncton
AND
JONAS HAGMANN
ETH Zu¨rich
In his 1998 article, The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline, Ole
Wæver suggested to assess the development and organization of the
International Relations (IR) discipline through a three-tier comparative
sociological research framework. It is by looking at the intellectual, insti-
tutional, and political layer of IR, so he argued, that one can fully under-
stand the specificities of IR as a complex social field of work as well as
the particular forms of knowledge that are developed in this field. In the
years following its publication, Wæver’s article was joined and followed
up by a growing and increasingly sophisticated body of literature study-
ing IR scholarship. Yet, a thorough reading of this literature shows that
the emerging sociology of IR has come to focus strongly on only two of
Wæver’s three analytical layers: It is the intellectual and political layers of
IR that garnered significant attention thus far, whereas work about the
field s institutional layer remains surprisingly scarce. This forum seeks to
address this gap by means of promoting a dedicated engagement with
the field’s institutional determinants: How is the institutional layer of IR
organized in different places? How is the discipline embedded in distinct
sites? And how is it governed by material and immaterial institutional
constraints? To answer these questions, the forum s six individual contri-
butions focus on conventional university departments and hybrid sites of
international relations alike. In doing so, the forum s ambitions are both
to highlight the empirical diversity of sites and settings where specialized
knowledge about international relations is produced, shaped, and re-
instantiated, and to illustrate how a focus on the institutional layer of IR
can become an important vector for opening up the literature to insights
from related fields of study.
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With his 1998 article, The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline, Ole Wæver
launched a comprehensive research agenda on the sociology of International
Relations (IR). In his widely read article, Wæver proposed to assess and explain
the development and organization of IR through a three-tier comparative
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sociological research framework: Drawing on a sociologist of the social sciences,
Peter Wagner, he constructed an analytical model around three irreducible socio-
logical layers, the field’s intellectual, institutional, and political constellations
(Wæver 1998, 694). In the case of IR, Wæver argued that the intellectual layer pri-
marily designates the field’s internal intellectual features, and thus the social
structures and theoretical traditions upon which IR scholarship rests in different
locations. The institutional layer, by contrast, refers to IR’s organizational condi-
tions and disciplinary patterns, that is, the embodiment of social scientific studies
as such, as well as the positioning of IR as an autonomous/disciplinary or interdis-
ciplinary field within the broader context of academia. The political layer, finally,
refers to relations between IR and society at large—cultural styles, traditions of po-
litical thought, as well as forms of statehood and foreign affairs agendas in places
where IR scholarship is developed. It is by looking at all these three tiers that one
can understand the specificities of IR as a complex social field of work as well as
the particular forms of knowledge that are developed in this field (cf. Figure 1).
In the years following its publication, Wæver’s article was joined and followed up
by a growing and increasingly sophisticated body of literature studying international
relations (IR) scholarship. One group of scholars examined in ever more empirical
detail the multifaceted intellectual structures of IR, identifying and problematizing
its theoretical (Breuning, Bredehoft, and Walton 2005), thematic (Hamati-Ataya
2012), communicative (Kristensen 2012), and pedagogical penchants (Biersteker
2009). Another set of researchers began examining how IR scholars develop their
theories and concepts through constant interaction with actors from other fields of
international practice (Eriksson and Norman 2011; Bu¨ger and Bethke 2014), how
they reflect or rely on local political, cultural, and geo-epistemic features
(Jørgensen and Knudsen 2006; Sergounin 2009; Tickner and Wæver 2009), and
how disciplinary contributions do or may have praxeological effects on the empiri-
cal world of IR (Bu¨ger and Villumsen 2007), that is, how IR frameworks themselves
may contribute to making—and sometimes also keeping—world politics as it is.
These bodies of literature underscore IR’s own intellectual, cultural, and politi-
cal inclinations, and by doing so, they help challenge objectivist views on IR schol-
arship as a mere reflection of international practices. Yet, a thorough reading of
the literature shows that these important merits notwithstanding, the emerging
sociology of IR has been focusing strongly on two of Wæver’s three analytical
layers thus far. It is the intellectual and political layers of IR that have garnered
significant scholarly attention, whereas work about the field’s institutional layer
remains surprisingly scarce.
Institutional frameworks are nevertheless fundamental to a comprehensive un-
derstanding of IR, for a thorough understanding of IR scholarship also requires
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Figure 1. Wæver’s Three layers for a sociology of IR (authors’ illustration).
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considering articulations of its organizing practices and scientific language in dif-
ferent institutional contexts (Grenier 2015). This is to say that the generation
and transmission of IR knowledge also depend significantly on the discipline’s
configuration in organizations and sites such as university departments, higher
education administrations, and—less conventionally—professional schools and
think tanks (Eriksson and Sundelius 2005). By the same token, the discipline
is also deeply embedded in local and transnational settings, such as national
higher education systems or the worldwide commercialization of higher educa-
tion, that is, broader institutional factors that have impact on the way sites of IR
are governed, and thus how the creation, shaping, and dissemination of IR schol-
arship is effected on an everyday basis (cf. Plantan 2002; Kessler and Guillaume
2012).
This forum seeks to promote a more dedicated engagement with the institu-
tional layer of the field. Its ambition is to highlight the diversity of sites and
settings where specialized knowledge about IR is produced, shaped, and reinstan-
tiated. In doing so, the focus on the institutional layer of IR becomes an impor-
tant vector for opening up the existing literature to insights from related fields of
study. Through the institutional prism, the study of IR can be connected to the
sociology of bureaucratic and corporate organizations (e.g., Selznick 1948;
Foucault 1979; Scott 2000), and it can link to insights from sociologists of (social)
science (e.g., Dogan and Pahre 1990; Garforth and Kerr 2011). Furthermore, the
field’s internal processes can be addressed through the sociology of professions
(e.g., Abbott 1988; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014) or literatures on transnational
communities of thought and practice (e.g., Haas 1992; Adler 2005).
To promote such a focus on IR’s institutional layer, this forum turns to the for-
mal organization of the selected disciplinary aspect of IR education, that is, the
diverse activities through which scholars prepare, configure, and enact transmis-
sion of IR scholarship to student and (mainly future) practitioner audiences. The
focus on IR education serves tactically to operationalize the proposed research
perspective in the context of limited space, but it also serves strategically to lend
more weight to the empirical case of educational practices in general. Of these,
some scholars have already provided insightful examinations. For instance,
Stefano Guzzini (2001) discussed the relevance of IR theory teaching for develop-
ing students’ intellectual autonomy, reflexivity, and capacity to respond to shifting
challenges in their future professional activities. John Ishiyama and Marike
Breuning (2004) examined occurrences and types of education activities like
introductory, capstone, or methods requirements in International Studies under-
graduate programs in the United States. Martin Mu¨ller (2011) assessed the disci-
plinary practices through which vocational schools of international politics train
“geopolitical subjects”, and Alan Chong and Natasha Hamilton-Hart (2009) ex-
tended the analysis of IR education to teaching practices in Southeast Asia.
Yet, contributions along these lines are still relatively rare overall, and they have
not yet developed into an integrated subfield of inquiry. Indeed, IR has paid
surprisingly limited attention to the educational functions thus far. In fact, the ex-
isting literature focuses more strongly on the production and circulation of inter-
national knowledge among scholars than on the dissemination of such knowledge
to broader publics (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014). By selecting the case of IR
education for our analysis, the forum thus underlines the praxeological perspec-
tive of IR as a field of work which, through various institutionally defined ways of
knowledge transmission, can play important roles itself in (re-)producing schol-
arly and international practices.
How does the organization of social scientific fields, education policies, and re-
lated institutional transformations condition the production and diffusion of
scholarly knowledge aboutIR? The following six interventions are grouped in
three clusters to address different aspects of this question, namely conventional
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university departments, hybrid sites of international education, and research
methodology. Inanna Hamati-Ataya (Aberystwyth University) initiates the forum
and its first set of contributions by focusing on the evolving configurations and
functions of public universities. How does the evolving institutional sociology of
these sites affect the roles and capabilities of universities—and of the academic
field of IR—to either change or (re)produce national and international orders,
she asks. Thomas Biersteker (The Graduate Institute) follows up on this debate
with a deeper analysis of management logics within university departments. His
intervention addresses how ranking and evaluation schemes of different sorts—
categorizations of journals, quantitative measures of scholarship, and organiza-
tional benchmarking methods inspired by corporate management logics—be-
come embodied in IR and how they contribute to normalizing the discipline by
stripping it of some of its most “worthy institutional politics.”
The following three contributions move beyond conventional university depart-
ments to foreground the variety of sites and institutional settings in which IR
education operates. Thierry Balzacq (The Institute for Strategic Research, Paris)
looks at education in international politics at the Paris-based Ecole de Guerre. His
contribution shows how a pragmatic approach to IR education prevails in this
type of site, and how this approach is driven by implicit geopolitical interests, ad-
ministrative penchants, and professional ideals of skill teaching—thus questioning
the ways in which the institutional sociology of a particular organization affects
the type of international knowledge it pursues. With their focus on diplomatic
academies, Jonas Hagmann (ETH Zu¨rich) and Marina Lebedeva (MGIMO
Moscow) then highlight another hybrid site of IR education. Their contribution
examines how education activities and preferred types of knowledge are governed
by “statist” institutional designs at places such as the US Foreign Service Institute,
Clingendael, or the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, and how such designs are
reconfigured by new demands for international savoir-faire, the establishment of
regional academies, and the commercialization of higher education. Jason Lane
(SUNY) concludes the second group of interventions by examining International
Branch Campuses (IBCs) as specific sites of IR education and internationaliza-
tion. His contribution traces how IBCs reproduce institutional structures and
practices abroad, and it ponders the question of how such projections of mainly
Western governance frameworks do or do not contribute to making IR a more
global discipline.
The final contribution to the forum then directs attention to methodological
dimensions involved in operationalizing an institutional sociology of IR. These
are previewed by Martin Mu¨ller (University of Zu¨rich), who looks at MGIMO
Moscow to analyze the ways in which the institutional sociology of a school con-
tributes to fashioning a particular set of IR students. His contribution shows how
an ethnographic approach to IR sites can produce highly instructive insights to
an institutional sociology of IR, thus making the case for including this methodol-
ogy into the portfolio of reflexive IR analyses.
How is the institutional layer of IR organized in different places? How is the disci-
pline embedded in distinct sites? And how is it governed by material and imma-
terial institutional constraints? Through a focus on education, the forum
contributions give first yet highly instructive analytical, empirical, and methodologi-
cal insights into the relatively neglected institutional layer of Wæver’s sociology of
IR. Far from giving definite answers to the questions posed, they help open up a
comprehensive and productive research agenda on the institutional organization of
the discipline, its configurations and effects, and they provide means for integrating
the bodies of literature from the cognate fields of study when so doing.
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IR, the University, and the (Re)-Production
of Order: Between Perversions of Agency
and Duties of Subversion
INANNA HAMATI-ATAYA
Aberystwyth University
The discipline of IR was born in a time and place characterized by the consolida-
tion of the university as the leading social institution of advanced learning and
teaching. This contribution addresses two dimensions that can guide our think-
ing about IR’s socioeducational impact as delineated and mediated by its univer-
sity-bound condition, a condition that is presumably different from that of other
institutions and sites of knowledge production and transmission, such as private
institutes, professional schools, or think tanks. Each dimension calls for two
types of reflection: A sociohistorical one that aims to understand the situation IR
faces within the liberal, public university and vis-a`-vis the broader public realm
and an axiological-normative one that aims to identify the possibilities for mean-
ingful socioacademic action. These types of inquiry and their associated dis-
courses and objectives are classically opposed, but need not, and should not be.
A sociological understanding of IR enables us to negotiate the interconnected-
ness of what is and what ought to be intelligently and responsibly, along the same
“logic” applied against the social sciences by political agents who have long un-
derstood this interconnectedness and learned to use it at our, and society’s,
expense.
The first point to consider is that the university’s social position and relation to
the social order are intrinsically ambivalent. The same institution that was notori-
ously irrelevant or resistant to the progressive developments of Europe’s “enlight-
enment” era (Anderson 2006, 21) was simultaneously viewed by conservative
groups as a space of social subversion that, for Hobbes, was “as mischievous to
[the] Nation as the Wooden Horse was to the Trojans” (quoted in Gascoigne
1989, 18). Such ambivalence persists to this day. In parallel to the consolidation
of the university as a progressive and innovative social institution serving “truth”
and “society,” runs the very concrete reality of its role in the reproduction of so-
cial order(s) and their constitutive hierarchies, inequalities, and legitimating ide-
ologies. The sociologies of science and education have explored this paradox at
the level of national social orders, to unmask the ways these institutions function-
ally contribute to propagating the ideas and dispositions that mediate the repro-
duction of extant social structures and practices. IR has started to explore it at the
level of the international/global order(s), the realm it inhabits intellectually and
pedagogically as a discipline itself subjected to global hierarchies.
These sociological studies tell us that, as an institutionalized field of knowl-
edge and practice, IR is the product of structures and processes of local- and
global-order making and power relations. As shown by Hagmann and Biersteker
(2014) in their review of Western university IR curricula, teaching practices and
programs mostly tend to reproduce conservative and mainstream views rather
than “reflexive” ones and are more likely to privilege orientations that are in
line with their institutions’ geocultural positions in the world. When integrated
into a wider perspective that relates these geocultural positions to one another
and to less privileged positions, it becomes obvious that IR also contributes to
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reproducing global structures of order and hegemony through its own educa-
tional practices (Tickner and Wæver 2009). These practices are merely the ex-
ternal manifestation of the symbolic impact the social order has on our mental
structures and representations of it, which makes it more efficiently performa-
tive of its own “truths”—as feminist and postcolonial scholarship has eloquently
been demonstrating for decades (see Harding 1998). It is, therefore, legitimate
to hypothesize that epistemic violence, which is the core operating principle of
symbolic violence, is at work in similar ways at the national, international, and
global levels. This is problematic because while one might accept that the teach-
ing of world affairs might be more or less naturally governed or predetermined
by particularistic, power-based concerns and agendas in such institutions as dip-
lomatic or military schools (as illuminated by Hagmann and Lebedeva and
Balzacq in this forum), the same phenomenon takes an entirely different mean-
ing, and has very different social and moral implications, in the case of the pub-
lic university.
Apart from a general understanding of wide-ranging internal trends, we know
much more about IR’s role in the reproduction of the global order in/at the “pe-
riphery”—where the postpositivist-favored proble´matique of the “knowledge-power
nexus” finds its greatest and most political exemplification—than about everyday
macro- and micro-processes of social reproduction affecting Western and non-
Western societies. These are the processes through which university education
shapes the generational transmission of dominant frames of seeing and valuing,
which are traditionally associated with “ideology” (Althusser 2008) and “accultura-
tion.” At the global level, although we understand that the reproduction of
dominant ideas produced by an existing social or international order is likely to
reinforce dominant practices that sustain and legitimize that order, we still need
to understand why and how this happens in specific contexts. The corollary of this
inquiry is an understanding of the university’s role in the mediation of processes
of “subversion” of the existing ideational order (i.e., “sociocultural revolutions”),
as witnessed, for example, during the students movement of the 1960s (Bourdieu
1990): What happens to the “dissident,” “subversive” ideas that are effectively pro-
duced through IR scholarship and transmitted to new generations through IR
university curricula? And more importantly, is such a subversive knowledge chan-
neled to society beyond the safely “critical” walls of the IR classroom? Levine and
McCourt (2014) have recently asked whether theoretical “pluralism” really mat-
ters in the discipline if such diversity does not translate into different practical
political outcomes. One should equally ask whether our scholarly oppositions pro-
duce different educational practices, and if so, whether the latter also translate
into different social practices and outcomes.
The truth is that we have no answers to such basic questions about IR’s actual
impact because we still have not systematically investigated the processes of circu-
lation and concretization of ideas within and across societies—and we need an
international sociology of knowledge to do so systematically. We could be assuming
benefit/harm where there is none—that is, assuming relevance where IR is utterly
irrelevant or inefficient—and ignoring less visible forms of impact embedded in
longue-dure´e societal changes mediated by university-based educational frameworks
and practices. In other words, our logical-conceptual understanding of the relations
of (dis)similarity between (textbook) ideas in IR and ideas in the world is no (dis)-
proof of their actual relations—and no amount of theoretical debating and argu-
mentation can make these relations more or less real or valid. If we rather adopt
a realist approach and consider knowledge from a material perspective—as a “prod-
uct” and “property” (Fuller 1992)—it becomes possible to empirically track the
circulation of specialized knowledge from the university into the general political
economy of symbolic exchanges and understand the different ways specific world-
views and practices “translate” or not socially into systems of beliefs, dispositions,
338 IR, the University, and the (Re)-Production of Order
and skills that can be mobilized to produce judgments, actions, and long-term in-
stitutionalized practices.
Given the importance accorded to the university as the site of “universal’ and
“critical” aspirations, one way of problematizing the issue is to consider the ef-
fects of the disjunction between the university’s internal vocation and its social func-
tion. The social function whereby the university serves progressive societal needs
while operating as a stabilizer and a pacifier of the social order can be conceptu-
alized in terms of the creation and destruction of knowledge as a “positional
good” (as defined by Hirsch 1977, chap. 3). Moving away from the idealist con-
ception of knowledge as a “public good” whose value is unaffected by its social
distribution and consumption, social epistemologist Steve Fuller (2006,2009) en-
joins us to consider the “schizoid” role that the university plays in the creation of
social capital (in the Bourdieusian sense) through knowledge production (re-
search) and its destruction through knowledge transmission (teaching). In other
words, the cognitive innovation that is the heart of the university’s internal voca-
tion creates social advantage, that is, an excess of capital for some, and this ad-
vantage is lost as this capital becomes more widely distributed through public
higher education.
Assuming a reasonable functioning of the researcher–teacher and research-
led-teaching models, this process should be studied in order to understand what
social advantages get passed on or lost through general and specific educational
practices, and how IR’s content/meaning is transformed, made efficient, or neu-
tralized, in this spatial translation from one public realm to the other. What is
certain is that this model needs to take into account the ways IR travels through
the ordered paths of international hierarchy. If IR pedagogy perpetuates the in-
stitutional and symbolic power of the “core” over the “periphery,” as alluded to
above, then it is obvious that although the capital of those on the receiving end
might increase on some individual level, it is simultaneously decreasing on a
range of collective levels, thereby further enhancing, rather than destroying, the
social, collective advantages of the producers. Postcolonial societies understand
very well how their chances at autonomous development are undermined by the
systematic cultural surrender of their institutions to Western models and influ-
ences, whether directly or through the education of their elites in the universi-
ties of the “metropoles” (Fanon 2001; for insights from postcolonial studies on
education, see Kelly and Altbach 1984). In this process, the social sciences and
humanities are subjected to the opposite logic than that of the “hard” and tech-
nical sciences, which are protected through patents and rules of transmission
that often make them inaccessible beyond their production site precisely be-
cause the international diffusion of such knowledges destroys the material ad-
vantages of the producers. But in the case of a subject matter like IR, diffusion
translates as enhanced advantage—as IR scholars themselves understand in rela-
tion to states’ “soft power.” In this case, an institutional sociology of IR would
need to investigate how IR pedagogy is inscribed in the university’s articulation
of its internal vocation with its social function of a stabilizer and a pacifier of the
global order.
Another important question concerns the way that this university-bound pro-
cess of creation–destruction of social advantage affects “criticality” on both sides
of the pedagogical relation—the criticality of researchers–teachers as well as that
of students. But to address this notion in equally realist terms beyond our abstract
and idealistic conceptions of “critique,” “critical thought,” and “critical thinking,”
we need to confront the second important paradox of a university-bound intellec-
tual vocation, namely, the fact that the social independence and autonomy of the
academe, which was won through fierce struggles against competing social author-
ities and groups, has in effect been achieved not merely at the price of a greater
isolation from the wider public realm, but also at the expense of intellectuals’
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social autonomy and subversive potential. Replacing the “itinerant workers” of the
“Enlightenment,” today’s researchers–teachers are
civil servants who, in the first instance, address each other in jealously guarded
(‘peer-reviewed’) zones of discourse and only then, after that initial filtering pro-
cess, the larger society. Consequently, their potential for incendiary speech has
been domesticated into reasoned cultural critiques and piecemeal policy advice
(Fuller 2009, 22).
No doubt, this “domestication” has not fully erased academics’ ability to pursue
and transmit genuinely critical/subversive research. It can also be argued that it is
this very process that enables us to perform our intellectual and pedagogical voca-
tion objectively, safely, and for the benefit of all. But as academics who struggle
with the neoliberal “impact agenda” implicitly and paradoxically understand, the
university’s privileged status as a social space sufficiently removed from social
struggles simultaneously alienates it from the pulse, experience, practice, and
needs of everyday life. As an alternative to the classical Weberian view on the sci-
entific “vocation,” I wish to briefly advance two different, related arguments in re-
lation to this problem.
First, IR scholars who worry about their social role have an interest in re-
claiming their social autonomy by setting the terms of their situated social rele-
vance. To do so requires that the theory-practice problem be addressed anew,
this time from a specifically praxeological perspective. The recent “practice turn”
in IR should expand the praxeological posture in the two opposite directions
it has so far largely ignored: the level of our epistemic reflection and that of
our pedagogical practice. Engaging the first level would enable us to reconcep-
tualize “criticality” in terms that are not alienated or abstracted from the stuff
of social and international experience and practice, and that can hence respond,
through an engagement at the second (pedagogical) level, to the cognitive and
practical needs of real social agents and groups confronting real social prob-
lems. This entails rethinking the relation of research and teaching, and seri-
ously considering the advantages of a reversed, teaching-led-research paradigm of
academic practice, whereby criticality is constantly gauged in relation to the
sociohistorically situated life experience of new generations of learners, and
theory is informed by the challenges that arise from differentiated experiences
of the global. Without such a praxeological posture, IR will keep ignoring, for
example, the fact that when traveling beyond their production sites, so-called
“critical” approaches can have negative effects on the cultural and practical au-
tonomy of students and elites of the “periphery,” whereas “mainstream”
approaches can better help them confront the logic of hegemonic threats di-
rected at their societies.
Second, we need to move beyond the analytical discussion of the relation of
facts to values/norms, and science to politics, which distorts our understanding of
science’s actual social function and effects. That a reasonably objective sociohistor-
ical understanding of the world leads to value preferences and normative choices
rather than political or ethical “neutrality” is something that “political man” has
discovered long before any sophisticated philosophical discussion of the alleged
nature and antagonism of “descriptive” and “prescriptive” claims about reality.
I suggest that the history of the (neoliberal) political establishment’s efforts to
constrain the development, visibility, and socioeducational impact of the social
sciences whenever their critical role of unmasking objective structures of social re-
production, control, and domination starts to bear its fruits is the historical prag-
matic indicator of the relation between objective knowledge and political values and
norms. A sociohistorical understanding of the conditions of possibility, nature,
and impact of our own institutional condition is, therefore, a necessary and
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sufficient step for delineating a morally and politically meaningful pedagogical
and social practice.
This is the wider project and promise that a sociology of IR holds for the disci-
pline and its members: To better understand our condition and practice within
the university, society, and the global order, so that we rise to the challenges of
our “vocation.” But as far as pedagogy is concerned, the ultimate question for us
remains: can an IR curriculum truly pose any serious threat or danger to existing
global structures of power-knowledge? If it cannot, is teaching IR an endeavor
worth pursuing at all beyond the training of a limited class of future civil servants
involved in the management of world politics, regardless of our idealist attach-
ment to abstract conceptions of social utility, critique, and progress?
Self-Assessment, Reviews, and External
Evaluation Exercises in International
Relations Education
THOMAS BIERSTEKER
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
Practices of IR pedagogy—the design of an IR curriculum, the determination of
required courses in an IR program, the sequences of courses, the division of the
subject into subfields, decisions about new hiring directions, what we teach, and
how we teach it—are not separate from the practices of world politics. They are
an integral part of it. In the classroom (or in other aspects of our scholarly profes-
sional lives), IR theory, foreign policy doctrine, and policy practices are deeply in-
terconnected. The ways we teach, the advice we give to our students, the exam
questions we write, and the thesis projects we direct and approve, serve to rein-
force, interrogate, or undermine dominant approaches to, and interpretations of,
international practice (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014). Whether they reinforce
or challenge an existing order, these are acts of participation in world politics and
international practice. Teaching theory is a form of practice, not something sepa-
rate from or outside of practice. The effects of teaching IR theory may not imme-
diately affect the policy-makers currently in power—although there are recurring
efforts to bridge the gaps between theory and practice (Lowenthal and Bertucci
2014)—but the indirect and long-term consequences of these practices can be
considerable. As Keynes observed, most economic policy initiatives are the brain-
child of some academic scribbler of a few years back (Keynes 1936, chap. 24).
The IR scholar and his/her intellectual tools are invariably a part of the social
and political contexts of their investigation. Although most social scientists recog-
nize the presence of a certain amount of bias in their research (and that the
choice of a research topic or seminar is often value based), most explicitly attempt
to minimize it by standing outside of their object of their study, to the extent pos-
sible. For the analytical–empirical IR scholar, the pursuit of social science should
be value neutral. Sometimes scholars use abstract mathematical formalisms of ex-
clusivity and exhaustiveness to accomplish this, at other times, they achieve it
through reflexivity. We all participate in, or are “subjective” about, the subject of
our study. IR scholars need to be consciously self-aware, to recognize their
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involvement in the practices of international affairs—in curriculum design, insti-
tutional development, strategic planning, and everyday classroom interaction—
and to reflect critically on these involvements. That is, we should ask questions
about how our research and teaching either reinforces or transcends dominant
scholarly research programs, doctrines, foreign policy practices, and ideologies.
Scholars during the Cold War contributed actively (and passively) to the perpetu-
ation of worldviews associated with both sides of that conflict. One could say the
same for analysts of counter-terrorism policy or the articulation of alternatives to
liberal internationalism today. Dominant ideologies routinely claim to be “realis-
tic” and in so doing attempt to reinforce their dominance (Ashley 1984). It takes
a conscious effort first to recognize and subsequently to divorce oneself from
dominant (hegemonic) modes of inquiry (also see Hamati-Ataya this forum).
This is not only an individual or personal matter. It is also a collective and often
an institutional one. Over the course of my career, I have participated in ten dif-
ferent institutional evaluations of IR departments, research centers, or multidisci-
plinary institutes as an external evaluator—in Europe, North America, East Asia,
and the Caribbean. I cannot recall the number of times outside reviewers evalu-
ated an institution with which I was affiliated. There are some standard patterns
in external evaluations—from the articulation of procedures for review by univer-
sity administrators to the preparation of a department self-study, the selection of
external reviewers, the assemblage of material for reviewers, the organization of
site visits, the meetings of external committees with senior administrators, depart-
ment chairs, faculty, staff, students, and sometimes even employers or public con-
stituencies like ministries of foreign affairs. In some institutions, specialized
quality control units and teams of full-time administrative professionals adminis-
ter these procedures. In others, the arrangements are more ad hoc, managed by
academic deans and their administrative staffs. In either case, a great deal of intel-
lectual time and energy can go into these practices. Why do departments under-
take evaluations, and what are their implications for IR education?
Sometimes the reasons are deeply institutionalized to the point of being virtu-
ally constitutional—every academic unit must be reviewed on a periodic basis, as
required by government legislation or university rules. Sometimes external re-
views are motivated by crisis—such as when an institution has fallen dramatically
in prestige or experiences a succession crisis in its leadership. Sometimes they are
organized by a new leadership to mobilize support for institutional innovation
and change, to legitimize a fundraising campaign, or to justify new hiring direc-
tions. Whatever the motivation, they are institutional practices that have real
consequences for our lives, for our intellectual directions and possibilities, for our
students, and ultimately for the world they will inhabit and in some instances,
lead.
Over the last twenty years, business and institutional competitiveness has in-
creasingly taken over the language of educational evaluation. The reasons for this
are many, but it is not unusual for self-evaluations to be organized around assess-
ments of institutional strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT).
Governments and other funding agencies are increasingly using “results-based
management” to assess the impact of their grants for international research and
training. IR education is a global industry and institutions of learning are con-
stantly being ranked (and marketed) in terms of status, prestige, performance,
and value for money. Senior academic administrators—from presidents and pro-
vosts to deans—succeed or fail on the basis of comparisons of quantitative indica-
tors of institutional performance under their leadership, hence making
benchmark competitor analysis and strategic planning increasingly imperative for
them. It should be of little surprise that institutional evaluation is such an impor-
tant part of our lives today. As David Bromwich (2014, 50) points out in a recent
article on higher education, “the administrative bureaucracy of universities has
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grown at a rate that far outpaces the growth of faculties; and much of the expan-
sion goes to build up a regimen of institutional self-monitoring and self-
measurement.”
External evaluation is not necessarily a bad thing. It can help an institution or
department see things about itself that it would otherwise have difficulty recogniz-
ing. Evaluation is an important mechanism of accountability, and the very process
of evaluation can increase transparency among diverse constituencies within an
institution. It can also open new spaces and/or create a basis for consensus
around innovative new approaches and institutional ideas. One of the advantages
of conducting an evaluation is that the external evaluators themselves also come
away with new ideas about how to address institutional problems at home. At the
same time, evaluations can also do harm, such as when they impose their own vi-
sion or intellectual priorities on an institution with little effort to understand local
context or history, or in some instances, when they put an existing institution into
virtual receivership (which usually means a subsequent takeover by its higher
administration).
Because the boards of trustees of many of the world’s most prestigious (and,
therefore, global standard setting) private academic institutions often come from
a business background, the administrations who report to them communicate in
terms of the language of business. They want and need shorthand indicators—
usually in the form of quantitative measures—of quality and performance of their
faculty and students. The same dynamic has emerged from governments, whose
educational ministries are also evaluated in terms of globally competitive mea-
sures of student achievement on standardized examinations. Following the re-
forms of the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom, UK higher education
was transformed—some say for good, most for ill—by the quantitative assessment
exercises that linked resource allocation to standardized quantitative measures of
institutional performance. As James Scott (2012, 119) argues, the appeal of quan-
titative measures comes from “a democratizing belief in equality of opportunity as
opposed to inherited privilege, wealth, and entitlement, on the one hand, and a
modernist conviction that merit can be scientifically measured on the other.”
While accountability and objectivity are laudable goals, we have all experienced
the sometimes perverse consequences of reliance on quantitative indicators of ed-
ucational performance or scholarly achievement (likened by Bromwich as an em-
ulation of the LA Fitness motto: What gets measured, gets improved).
Quantitative measures are performative and can produce homogenizing effects
among their subjects (Porter 1994). Their introduction can distort priorities, re-
place quality of product with quantity of production, create powerful incentives to
teach to standardized exam questions (about realism and liberalism), and contrib-
ute to a general homogenization of scholarly work. They serve to discipline us
into routine practices with fixed incentives, rewards, and penalties. If everyone
tries to publish in the same, most prestigious IR journals and presses globally, the
editors and boards of those publishers—however broad gauged and enlight-
ened—will invariably determine the direction of global scholarly work. The major
journals and presses in IR today are US based and written in the English lan-
guage. This has consequences for the normative content of our field.
The problems with reliance on quantitative indicators for evaluations of individ-
ual and institutional performance are three-fold. First, they may not measure
what they purport to measure. While we may consent to an evaluation system that
ranks journals and publishers on a scale from A to C, some marginal and poor
quality work appears in A journals, just as some brilliant, quirky, and innovative
work ends up in less prestigious C journals (or as chapters in edited volumes
that simply “don’t count” as much in standard evaluation schemes). The leading
journals in the field of international studies globally are parochially biased in a
number of ways—epistemologically, normatively, and linguistically. There are
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advantages to publishing in them (in terms of recognition and citation scores),
but the global pressure to publish in the same outlets produces a general homo-
geneity not a diversity of perspectives. Henrik Breitenbauch (2013) has described
the “Lego-like” components necessary for the publication of an article in a lead-
ing Anglo-American scientific journal, requirements that discriminate and work
systematically against someone trained in the French dissertation style of scholarly
writing.
Second, there is evidence that institutions globally are beginning to use the
same or similar, standards for the evaluation of scholarly quality. A publication in
an “international” journal (typically meaning a journal published in Europe or
North America) is important for scholarly recognition and promotion in many
parts of the developing world. Similarly, publication in a leading North American
journal can enhance the international standing and visibility of European schol-
ars. Within the United States, the standards for promotion have been passed
down in the hierarchy within higher education. In an effort strengthen their sta-
tus (and demonstrate the quality of their administrative leadership), institutions
like community colleges, with fundamentally different core purposes from
research universities, increasingly evaluate their faculty in terms of their publica-
tions in leading journals. As more and more institutions globally reward publica-
tion in the same journals and university presses, we are witnessing a global
homogenization of criteria for scholarly excellence and achievement. While this
can potentially facilitate new forms of global communication and foster the accu-
mulation of knowledge, it also stifles the production of diversity.
Third, the business and management literature on evaluations tells us that
monitoring and evaluation processes can inhibit institutional innovation and crea-
tivity (Chesbrough 2003). Evaluations are commonly based on a linear approach
to institutional development and because of their predetermined formats (to ex-
amine SWOT and use quantitative measures to track trends over time), they often
do not perceive innovative institutional developments. They tend rather to reward
safe thinking and predetermined outcomes, rather than radical innovation, risk-
taking, and experimental thinking. The general obsession with rankings, peer
comparisons, and benchmarked competitive analysis has established powerful in-
ternal incentives for recruitment, reappointment, promotion, and even in some
instances, salaries. Who determines these measures matters, but the power of
global market forces is such that even the most iconoclastic scholarly rebel faces
pressures to conform (if not only for one’s own sake but also on behalf of one’s
departmental colleagues or students). Although quantitative measures are conve-
nient shortcuts for administrators and external evaluators, they take away what
James Scott calls the “worthy politics” of a discipline or an institution.
There is. . .no substitute for this necessarily qualitative and always inconclusive discus-
sion. It is the lifeblood of a discipline’s character, fought out in reviews, classrooms,
roundtables, debates, and decisions about curriculum, hiring, and promotion. Any
attempt to curtail that discussion by, for example, Balkanization into quasi-autono-
mous subfields, rigid quantitative standards, or elaborate scorecards tends simply to
freeze a given orthodoxy or division of spoils in place (Scott 2012, 122).
When the quantity of production becomes more important than the quality of
its content, individual and institutional creativity and innovation suffer.
Institutional assessment exercises must hence tread a fine line between bench-
marking and reflection. On the one hand, evaluated institutions need to be strate-
gic. Evaluations are here to stay, and they can provide useful inputs to a
department. Departments should base their self-evaluations on a consensus pro-
cess about where an institution wants to go, with a leadership that has the tenacity
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to take a long-term perspective, and stay the course. Departments should also
carefully select external evaluators (if the institution being reviewed has this lux-
ury), evaluators should be proactively engaged by departments, and departments
should take the entire process seriously.
By the same token, however, there also needs to be critical awareness of evalua-
tions’ standardizing penchants. Inside departments, this means that a simple up-
date of the last chair’s report is never sufficient for a self-assessment. In relation
to external evaluators, this means that faculty should listen to their advice—but
that when communicating with them during site visits, or when responding to
their reports, that faculty should not be too defensive or too fatalistic. External
evaluations typically contain some good advice, but they sometimes also contain
some bad ideas. A critical engagement with their reports and a persuasive rebuttal
to a senior administration can provide a department or institute with more re-
spect—and sometimes, more resources—to pursue innovative and reflexively criti-
cal directions that are vitally needed in international affairs education.
Pragmatism and Educational
Philosophy in IR
THIERRY BALZACQ
The Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM), French Ministry of Defense
Philosophy of science has for decades incorporated the notion that educational
philosophies underwrite choices in educational practices and content (Phillips
1985; Curren 2003; Ozmon and Craver 2008). Philosophy of education examines
the factors, either individual or social, which govern educational ideas and prac-
tices. Put simply, we might say “philosophy of education is a field where philo-
sophical inquiry is pursued that focuses upon issues arising within the domain of
education” (Phillipson 2010, 18). To the peril of their educational efficacy, how-
ever, IR scholars have usually eschewed explicit discussion about the kind of phi-
losophy of education their theoretical position warrants. There are two main
problems with this stance. The first is that it tends to study educational practices
as ends in themselves. The other problem is that it detaches educational practices
from their philosophical moorings. In other words, there is no consideration
whatsoever of the underlying principles of learning activities, and the extent to
which they fit, or live up to, the overall mission assigned to them by a given
institution (Neff 1966; Lucas 1969; Hirst 1983; Grenier and Hagmann in the in-
troduction to this forum). Thus, the argument is not only that concerns about IR
education have philosophical attributes but also that philosophy of education en-
ables us to clarify problems and circumstances that characterize IR education, in
various contexts.
Philosophy of education is not a new field of study, and the threads of its theo-
retical fabric are not easy to straighten out. Educational philosophers draw their
inspiration from the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Rousseau, Marx, Foucault,
Giroux, Skinner, James, or Dewey (Ozmon 2012). On the other hand, they ad-
dress a large spectrum of questions, ranging from meta-issues (debates among ed-
ucational scholars) to issues that are staples of political philosophy (is there a
right to education? If so, does it have any limits?), through epistemological
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questions (what should be taught in schools, and how should curricula choices be
justified?). In a nutshell, issues pertaining to the aims of education, methods, the
role of the teacher and the curriculum’s perimeters, all rely upon the philosophy
of education’s competence.
My contribution to this forum is, as such, both a plea and a (brief) demonstra-
tion (in the sense of substantiating a hypothetical argument). I hypothesize that in
many professional schools, such as diplomatic or military academies, the study of
IR is often a distillation or an encapsulation of “pragmatic common sense,” though
there is no attempt at reflexively examining the philosophical assumptions of their
practice. Throughout, I use the status of IR courses on the Paris’ War College
(Ecole de Guerre) curriculum as a yardstick that enables me to outline the pragmatic
character of teaching world politics. In order to test my hypothesis, I conducted
semistructured interviews with five officers, who teach or have taught at the Ecole de
Guerre. Behind this case lies the idea that military academies are important learn-
ing environments for IR. IR education differs not only in length, contents, and
modes of pedagogy that bring it to life but also in the degree of depth aspired to.
But what shapes the previous differences is the philosophy that sustains a specific
IR education. Yet, IR scholars have given little thought to the philosophy of educa-
tion, and I can do no more here than raise the issue and indicate its implications
within one context. Philosophy of education is often paramount in the choice be-
tween what to include in and what to exclude from the curriculum. In short, it
conditions what is deemed “relevant.” The relevance of IR scholarship is, by defini-
tion, a difficult issue to settle; perhaps, philosophy of education can provide us
with useful insights into what matters for different institutional settings and im-
prove the ways we go about engaging these different professions.
Now, following from this, the plea underlying this text aims to spark a greater
awareness of the philosophical assumptions upon which different modes of teach-
ing and learning world politics rest. This matters not only because it abets a reflec-
tive attitude toward our teaching practices but also because it makes our teaching
commitments more explicit and shakes off inconsistencies between the aims of
education, on the one hand, and the curriculum and teaching practices that are
subsequently promoted, on the other hand.
IR-Related Themes at the Ecole De Guerre
The Ecole de Guerre prepares military officers for top jobs in various institutions
that deal with strategy and defense. Its curriculum is tailored to improve the offi-
cers’ judgment, decision-making, persuasive, and acting abilities (Decree n 2011,
323). The teaching of IR is embodied in two distinct modules: geopolitics and
strategy and defense policies. The module on geopolitics emphasizes methods
and a mixture of area study and problem-based approaches to IR. For instance,
Africa is dealt with through the lenses of demography and natural resources,
whereas the Arab world is treated through the specific channel of identity politics.
But the study of other major powers is not limited to any specific problem. The
module on strategy and defense policies comprises two pillars. The first clarifies
the internal functioning of the French Ministry of Defense, in particular the way
it produces its policies. The second element examines international organiza-
tions, focusing on actors who play a notable role in the diplomatic game (United
Nations, European Union, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, etc.) that ani-
mates world politics. Here, officers are brought into direct contact with the for-
eign affairs services, as the course runs under the aegis of both the Ecole de Guerre
and the Centre d’e´tudes diplomatiques et strate´giques, at the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
As it appears, there is no module on IR theories, let alone on critical views of se-
curity. The reason, so the argument goes, is that officers need to gain realistic
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experience of the subject and learn practically how to adjust to the changing envi-
ronment of world politics (Interview, Officer 1). Any abstract subject is, therefore,
treated with scorn. What matters is to train students to cope with events that
shape the world and to contribute directly to its evolution. Such concerns rest
upon an instrumental treatment of knowledge. Taken together, these features
suggest that the Ecole de Guerre entertains a detectable pragmatic approach to edu-
cation, but never in its explicit thrust.
Educational Pragmatism
Pragmatism is a broad intellectual tradition, which stretches to cover multiple
penumbra of meanings and schools. Fortunately, there are good presentations of
pragmatism in philosophy and of its applications and uses in IR (Cochran 2002;
Hellmann 2009). That said, when it comes to the philosophy of education, there
are some classics. Among them, John Dewey stands out preeminently. His philoso-
phy is also the backdrop against which other pragmatists sketch their own theo-
ries. I should, therefore, emphasize Dewey’s view as it provides us with the main
tenets of a pragmatic approach to education. Dewey revolutionized educational
theory, working at the Laboratory School that he founded and directed, at the
University of Chicago. School and Society, Democracy and Education, and Experience
and Education are some of his most influential books on the topic. There, Dewey
developed what can be regarded as a “positive philosophy” of education
(Johnston 2010, 106), that is, one that breaks with past, sterile dualisms such as
theory and practice, the individual and the society, the child and the curriculum,
and the child and the physical and social environments. Indeed, in all his work,
Dewey claimed that education must be holistic, articulating as it were, the child,
the society, and the curriculum. Thus, from Dewey’s point of view, educational
practices are embedded within and arise out of the interrelationship of three
components, which are a cure for previous dualisms: experimentalism, instrumen-
talism, and transformational transaction. I shall start with the third because it sus-
tains and nurtures the previous two.
Transformational transaction. At the Ecole de Guerre, IR courses are regarded as
tools to enable students to navigate the world as smoothly as possible. In this re-
spect, for instance, students are taught courses that clarify the institutional con-
texts that are likely to govern their work (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and United Nations). The knowledge gleaned therein is then applied to areas
that constitute France’s strategic priorities (European Union, Africa, the Middle
East, and Eurasia). Last, the relationship between France and major military
powers is explored (United States and China, in particular). In all these situa-
tions, the aim is to provide officers with an education that fosters the develop-
ment and improvement of skills that will enable them to effectively engage with
the world when they are called upon. This reflects a central element in military
education today. The rise of peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations puts the
military in an exceptional position, as “practical beings” tasked with the responsi-
bility to either reconstruct or mold the world. A substantial part of their training
is, therefore, geared toward that objective. According to Sleeper (2001, 3), prag-
matism sees thinking and learning as a “means of conducting transformational
transactions with the world, a means of changing or reconstructing the world.”
This stems from the basic principle of pragmatism, which is that individuals trans-
form their world through practice. However, practice enjoys a broader role in
Dewey’s pragmatism, as it is aimed at overcoming Cartesian dualism between the
subject and the object. “We are at root practical beings,” states Dewey; that is, “be-
ings engaged in exercise. This practice constitutes at first both self and the world
of reality. There is no distinction” (Dewey 1990, 154). Here, education is not only
meant to prepare students for life, but it is already a constitutive/fundamental
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part of their existence. Learning, therefore, occurs in social contexts and happens
gradually. In other words, the term that best characterizes education is growth.
That growth is multidimensional, as it concerns all the aspects that aid the individ-
ual to navigate and interact with the world, be they biological, emotional, or social
aspects. Transacting with the world is the necessary condition for that growth to
remain spry. But it is not sufficient; it calls for experimentation and instrumental-
ism to unleash its fruitful possibilities.
Experimentalism. The Ecole de Guerre is an exemplary model of experimentalism,
as it organizes many field trips, aimed at placing students “within the situation in
order to personally experience the problem” (Taatila and Raij 2012, 6). The pur-
pose of these field trips is not only to discover the terrain; they also serve a strong
pedagogical objective. Indeed, students are urged to observe, select important
data from the visits and expose´s they attend during the field trips, compare differ-
ent accounts, and propose a workable course of action. As such, field trips con-
nect thinking with social processes. In this sense, IR ideas are tested reflectively in
the “crucible of real-life experiences” (Ozmon 2012, 124). At the same time, stu-
dents use knowledge gained from the field in order to enliven their practical com-
petence. The contact with the environment is conducive to the intellectual
growth of students, a crucial end of military education (Interview, Officer 2). In
this light, the underlying principle of learning at the Ecole de Guerre and, I would
argue, in any military academy, is problem solving, which is, according to
Cox (1981), radically different from a critical theoretical philosophy.
Instrumentalism. Pragmatism, “takes its departure from acting” because,
Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 711) argue, “praxis creates its own logic.” It thus
renounces the view that teaching can be disconnected from experience and the
domain in which it will be put to use. This is a different way of saying that learn-
ing begins with practice and then, if necessary, moves up to higher levels of ab-
straction, not the other way around. The fact that a pragmatic philosophy of
education emphasizes practice is different from holding that it denigrates ideas,
concepts, and logic. Rather, it means that for pragmatists such as Dewey, these
are only tools (hence instrumentalism), not fixed frameworks that frustrate imagi-
nation and action.
There is a strong impetus for instrumentalism within the Ecole de Guerre. The up-
shot of this argument is that instrumentalism deepens experimentalism, in the
sense that pragmatism sees learning as vocationally oriented. That is, education
should cultivate students’ practical competence in coping with the evolving world.
To put it differently, we do not “live in order to learn”; instead, “we learn in order
to live” (Ardalan 2008, 22). In fact, pragmatism considers that education should
be preoccupied with why and what should be learned, and the target of that
knowledge. However, this should not be interpreted as pragmatism is preoccu-
pied with the content of the subject as such; rather, what matters, according to
pragmatism, is to deploy knowledge appropriately, adapting it to different needs
and contexts. In this respect, it is the ability to use knowledge adequately that is
of upmost importance to a pragmatic educational philosophy.
*
In the light of the preceding discussion, a pragmatic philosophy of education
seems to be a unique perspective through which we can better appreciate how and
what type of IR knowledge is received and used within a military environment.
However, one must take note that the pragmatism of military college was not of-
fered here as “the” model for IR education. Instead, it was examined as a useful
way to gain insights into how a specific philosophy of education impacts upon IR
education, and hence foregrounds difficult questions about the type of IR knowl-
edge that different professions single out. But this does not mean that each
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institution or educational setting is entirely dominated by one philosophy of educa-
tion. Matters are more mixed (see Hagmann and Lebedeva in this forum). Even in
military colleges, such as the Ecole de Guerre, some room is left to other philosophies
of education (realism, idealism, etc.). Universities, too, would be influenced by dif-
ferent kinds of philosophies of education. In turn, these philosophies would de-
pend upon the history of the institution, its intellectual milieu, its professional
objectives, and teachers’ profiles, all of which are often the result of power games
(see Hamati-Ataya’s contribution to this forum).
I put forth the idea that the Ecole de Guerre is sensitive to IR knowledge that cor-
responds to its objectives. Specifically, it considers that training outcomes depend
on the means selected. In other words, pragmatism appraises education as a pro-
cess in which content and form strongly influence the ends envisaged.
Furthermore, its problem-solving approach to knowledge is rooted in a critical un-
derstanding of theories, ideas, and concepts. However, it meets critical theories’
concerns when it opposes any attempt to reify those very concepts, ideas, and the-
ories. Whereas a pragmatic approach to education has its critics (see, e.g.,
Peters 1973), it should be clear that, in this piece, I wanted to contribute to a
broader interest in the stakes raised by any approach to education. Differences in
educational philosophies do raise genuine questions about the merits of different
approaches to a given body of knowledge (here: IR). But it also challenges us to
ask whether an IR curriculum only makes sense when it fits the instrumental
mold. And, if not, why? In other words, educational philosophy goes beyond the
description of teaching content in order to enquire into the ethical bases that sus-
tain educational choices. In this sense, it would seem that a critical philosophy
eventually bites the pragmatic tail.
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Teaching (as) Statist Practice: Diplomatic
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Diplomatic schools are instructive cases of how the production and dissemination
of “international knowledge” is conditioned by institutional factors. With their vo-
cational focus, diplomatic academies are first and foremost sites for educating the
praxis of state behavior. This orientation notwithstanding, the academies should
not be dissociated from disciplinary IR. Already, diplomatic academies are closer
to practical world politics and thus to the central research object of IR—a point
that itself warrants close(r) engagement with the diplomatic field and its
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professional reproduction (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2015). What is more,
the barriers between diplomatic and academic training have become more porous
recently, and both fields are marked by similar processes at their overarching in-
stitutional level, that is, elements such as evolving mandates, the internationaliza-
tion of contents and design, and a general commercialization of activities. With a
view to exposing a different site of international education and to generating fur-
ther insights on the institutional sociology of IR, this contribution considers diplo-
matic schools as interesting hybrid sites of international education (for the
military colleges as other such sites see Balzacq, this forum). To do so, we also
draw on our own professional involvement in diplomatic schools of different
sorts.
Diplomatic Academies in Perspective
Diplomatic schools are generally created by national governments and for the dis-
tinct purpose of giving state officials professional education in interstate affairs.
Diplomatic academies often remain affiliated with Ministries of Foreign Affairs
even today, cases in point being the US Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the Diplomatic
Academy of the Russian Federation, or the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
(Clingendael). Some academies also train civil servants beyond the immediate
purview of diplomacy, such as the French Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA).
But these schools, too, are very closely connected to state institutions. Variations
of this form also exist in terms of how diplomatic schools engage academic IR.
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy or the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations (MGIMO), for example, are deeply embedded in foreign policy circles
and active in scholarly IR practices, such as academic publishing, certification,
conferencing, and staffing.
In terms of audiences, however, diplomatic schools differ more clearly from
university departments and hence from the type of educational institution that
has garnered most attention in the sociology of IR literature thus far (cf.
Brown, Pegg, and Shively 2006; Hagmann and Biersteker 2014). Diplomatic
schools, which mainly offer vocational training for civil servants, differ from
university departments, which educate a wider and often also younger range of
students, who become active in international fields of work that are more
broadly defined. The academies also tend to produce more applied research
overall, and the highest degree they award is normally a terminal MA, not a
PhD or Habilitation (though doctorates can be obtained at some places, such as
Fletcher).
What is more, at diplomatic schools, the primary sources of authority are not
necessarily disciplinary knowledge and degrees. Such elements are not unimpor-
tant—and they are also reinforced by the increasing reliance on external lecturers
from university. Traditionally, however, practical aspects of everyday diplomatic
work dominate the curricula. For instance, considerable attention is devoted to
area studies on the places where diplomats can expect to be posted or on which
they are to become expert desk officers and to issues, such as protocol, the history
of international politics, and language training (including rare languages). Such
courses and skills are often taught by senior diplomats and state officials, which is
rarely or never the case at typical IR departments.
Traditionally, as this brief characterization shows, the activities of diplomatic
schools are hence directed rather strongly toward the praxis of IR. This orienta-
tion echoes the academies’ close proximity to governments, and it also shows up
in specific methods of instruction, for example, in the use of simulation games
(“plays of world politics”) and mundane things such as diplomatic reporting (i.e.,
the writing of cables; Kille, Krain, and Lantis 2008). Diplomatic schools also fea-
ture theoretical and conceptual courses. But these, too, are usually closely aligned
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with professional practices and experiences, which are still considered central to
developing a successful career in diplomacy (Paschke 2007). Current conflict
studies models, for example, are taught but also studied in the specific context of
current international disputes as a means of obtaining further knowledge about a
specific matter of interest to the government.
Shifting International and Institutional Terrains
With their state-oriented institutional design and praxis-oriented pedagogical ori-
entations, diplomatic schools contribute to reproducing international practices
(Mu¨ller 2011), and thus to making and keeping world politics as it is. Although
they do not theorize and analyze world politics using the scientific methods em-
ployed by academic IR (Neumann 2012), diplomatic academies are thus closely
connected with practices of international affairs. But diplomatic schools also share
further interfaces with the discipline, which is why they should be accounted for
when examining the development and organization of IR scholarship. As already
mentioned, some schools contribute regularly to academic journals, degrees, and
events, and thus to the discipline in a more scholarly sense. Diplomatic schools
also connect to IR through lecturers and students. The teaching programs of
many diplomatic academies draw on university professors, who join the schools as
high-profile external lecturers on various specializations of international affairs,
and most students now require a BA for admission to a diplomatic school, with IR
being a particularly popular specialization there.
Significantly for this forum, the production and dissemination of “international
knowledge” by diplomatic schools is also highly contingent on the institutional
level. Developments at this level bear interesting resemblances with those affect-
ing university departments, as three short illustrations suggest.
First, whereas universities are given new tasks in terms of outreach, “impact”
and funding, diplomatic schools too must implement new institutional man-
dates. Changes in the praxis of diplomacy in particular have translated into such
adaptations—and diplomatic work has indeed evolved quite significantly in re-
cent years (Stromquist and Monkmann 2000). The internationalization of previ-
ously national policy fields, new communication and surveillance technologies,
and the privatization of formerly state-controlled functions, for example, have
rendered diplomatic work more dynamic and thematically diverse. Diplomats to-
day increasingly deal with problems previously excluded from their professional
sphere, such as energy issues, higher education, internet regulation, climate
change, or (under the heading of “public diplomacy”) even public relations.
Many academies seek or must respond to this situation by developing new
courses (and sometimes also by offering new degrees), for example, by specializ-
ing on international migration, communication, or technology (for a showcase,
see Pfusterschmid-Hardtenstein 2008). Paralleling this thematic expansion of
what constitutes international affairs, diplomats must also increasingly work with
experts who have not been socialized into the logics of state bureaucracy and
policy implementation, for example, engineers, public health and aviation ex-
perts, or banking specialists. Such changes in diplomatic work translate into new
education mandates and condition the ways in which the international is ap-
proached and learned on-site.
Second, diplomatic education is also evolving in response to novel internation-
alization processes, that is, developments that are also observed among
university departments. This is to say that while universities are increasingly or-
ganized transnationally through joint degrees, professional associations, and
branch campuses (on IBCs also see Lane this forum), diplomatic schools have
been moving toward transnational modes of cooperation, education, and institu-
tional design as well. Since 1972, for instance, the International Forum on
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Diplomatic Training brings together heads of diplomatic schools with a view to
discussing “modern diplomacy and trends in diplomatic education”
(International Forum on Diplomatic Training 2016). Similarly, language instruc-
tion—a major asset to any diplomatic school—is increasingly taught by foreign
lecturers and made accessible to foreign students today (Sadri and Flammia
2011). Irrespective of the national origins of diplomatic schools, an understand-
ing of diplomacy as a transnational savoir-faire has hence been developing for
quite some time already, and it becomes embedded more widely as diplomatic
schools begin to develop into a larger, more integrated and transnational field
of international education.
This process also has repercussions in terms of institutional design. For in-
stance, diplomatic schools are now also developed overseas, that is, in other
countries, such as for the purpose of training the state officials of a newly
independent country in conventional diplomatic work (Zonova 2013).
The Diplomatic School of Armenia is such a case. It was founded in 2009 with sig-
nificant assistance of both the European Union and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (Diplomatic School of Armenia 2016).
What is more, some academies are now given “regional mandates.” The
Institute of International Relations of Cameroon, for instance, is a transnational
training center for students of the wider geographical region and so is the
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies or the newly created Diplomatic
Academy of the Caribbean (and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna serves as an older
example). Considering the historical national origins of diplomatic training,
such developments at the level of institutional design are interesting phenom-
ena. Although their graduates are not yet as numerous as those of certain
older, better established and connected national schools of foreign service—
the transnational student intake and teaching of these new training sites might
assist in moving diplomatic practices away from conventional nationalist con-
cerns and toward more pluralistic and transnational conceptions of world poli-
tics. In Europe, this process would be particularly interesting to monitor if the
European External Action Service were at some point to be backed up with its own
European Diplomatic Academy (Duke 2012).
Third, much as in as academic IR (Welch 2012), diplomatic academies, too,
are caught up in broader trends toward the marketization of higher education.
The internationalization of policy fields and professional spheres of all sorts
spurs demands for international savoir-faire across governmental branches, but
notably also within the private sector (Kesteleyn, Riordan, and Rue¨l 2014).
Some academies seize or are pushed to take this opportunity to open up their
courses to businessmen, journalists, and other specialists working in interna-
tional fields, a clientele that may now take courses on “business diplomacy,”
language and cross-cultural issues, even on diplomatic protocol and “eti-
quette.” Albeit rooted in statist frameworks, diplomatic schools are thus ex-
posed to, and have taken advantage of, the commercialization of higher
education (Arzhanova 2010). The idea that international knowledge can be
sold has rendered the nationalist penchant in diplomatic teaching less strin-
gent. Marketization spurs the integration of diplomatic schools into a global
field of higher education, promotes diversification of their student bodies
across professional fields and political borders, and subtly challenges govern-
ments’ prerogative to define the various research and teaching activities of the
academies.
Conclusions
Diplomatic schools are stimulating sites of international knowledge, and places
where the generation and dissemination of such knowledge interacts with
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sizable changes at the institutional layer today. How exactly these interactions
play out in different places is an interesting question to be addressed by an in-
stitutional sociology of IR. After all, not all academies are exposed to the same
political, institutional, and material constraints. Some are more willing or able
than others to appropriate, transpose, or reject evolving circumstances
(Lebedeva 2006), and some develop as a function of other student bodies
(see Mu¨ller, this forum), local regulations, and political agendas (Lequesne
and Heilbronn 2012). Analytically, diplomatic schooling also raises
challenging questions in regard to hybrid places of international schooling,
shifting authorities in what constitutes appropriate knowledge of and about
world politics, and new configurations between public and private interests.
With this, a research agenda centered on diplomatic academies has much po-
tential to contribute to the neglected institutional layer of the sociology of IR
and to detail the interplays between this and the “intellectual” and the “politi-
cal” components of IR (Wæver 1998). How evolving “intellectual understand-
ings” of praxis and the constitution of savoir-faire become embedded in,
mediated through, and sometimes prompted by the institutional layer, for in-
stance, are interesting questions to pursue in the development of a fuller soci-
ology of IR, and aspects on which the cases of diplomatic academies can
contribute.
Creating Embassies of Knowledge: Do
International Branch Campuses Mitigate or
Facilitate the Evolution of International
Relations?
JASON E. LANE
State University of New York
In his presidential address to the International Studies Association, Amitav
Acharya (2014, 1) observed that despite the fact that “IR schools, departments, in-
stitutes, and conventions have mushroomed around the world. . .the discipline
still needs to overcome a central challenge related to its British and North
American roots.” Interestingly, Acharya’s observation about the continued domi-
nance of IR perspectives rooted in particular Western nations comes during a
time of unprecedented structural internationalization of the very higher educa-
tion institutions that house those dominant IR programs (Rust and Kim 2012).
Thus, we find that the IR programs rooted in the United Kingdom and the
United States are not only extending their dominance over the intellectual
components of IR, they are also now replicating the very institutional structures
designed to protect and extend that intellectual dominance. Engaging the institu-
tional layer of the sociology of IR set forth by Wæver (1998), this contribution
problematizes how the expansion of universities into foreign countries, and the
associated replication of institutional structures, affects the development of IR.
Over the past two decades, there has been a rapid expansion in the global foot-
print of universities through the creation of foreign educational outposts
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(McBurnie and Ziguras 2007). These outposts, broadly labeled as part of cross-
border higher education, include research centers, study abroad locations, and
outreach offices. A subset of these outposts are International Branch Campuses
(IBCs), entities that are
owned, at least in part, by a foreign education provider; operated in the name of the
foreign education provider; engages in at least some face-to-face teaching; and pro-
vides access to an entire academic program that leads to a credential awarded by the
foreign education provider (Lane 2011, 1).
The first IBCs appeared in the 1920s, though development was slow and spo-
radic up until the 2000s, when a rapid proliferation of such entities occurred
(Lane, Farrugia, and Kinser 2014). As of early 2015, 155 institutions in thirty-two
countries exported 218 IBCs in sixty-seven countries (Cross-Border Education
Research Team 2015). There is wide variety in the size and scope of these entities
(Lane and Kinser 2011). The physical space of the campus ranges from a store-
front to a multibuilding campus with similar offerings as the home campus.
Annual enrolments range from fewer than 100 to more than 5,000 students. The
degree level spans associates to doctoral, with many focusing exclusively on gradu-
ate level programs. Some of the entities offer a comprehensive array of academic
programs; while some were singularly focused, such as in business or IR.
These IBCs are effectively embassies of knowledge, exporting an educational
experience from one nation to another. IBCs are an interesting focus here as they
are part of an historic trend of nations exporting their curriculum through the
replications of institutional structures. Acharya (2014) pointed to an example of
such in his address, explaining how British leaders established a college in India
in 1800 AD to provide the education that was the “requisite for the good govern-
ment and stability of the British Empire in India” (Roebuck 1819, xvi). The
college’s faculty were comprised of the British Sahibs and Indian Munshis; yet de-
spite the mission of the college to prepare the future “ministers and officers” of
the British Empire in India, the British Sahibs “set the agenda and. . .had the au-
thoritative voice in determining what was useful knowledge” (Cohn 1996, 51). For
Acharya, this college exemplified the enduring tension between the “West and
the rest.” Despite a mission to train local leaders; employment of local faculty with
in-depth knowledge of the local culture, languages, and people; and the institu-
tion being physically embedded in the local environment, it was the British and
their institutional designs that determined what was the appropriate knowledge
to be shared and how it was to be shared. As such while the college provided an
opportunity for the British to learn from the local people and evolve their curricu-
lum to reflect local knowledge, it was really a vehicle for the British to extend
their way of thinking on to others. Similar to the college in India, IBCs present a
case of how efforts to internationalize higher education have led to the wholesale
exporting (and importing) of particular institutional, curricular, and philosophi-
cal ways of studying international politics.
IBCs are among the more extreme versions of the internationalization of uni-
versities and allow for Western-based IR programs and the institutional structures
that support them to be embedded in foreign countries. The remainder of this
contribution uses a typology of place, people, content, and culture to explore the
tensions inherent in replicating particular institutionalizations of IR and how
those efforts may both reinforce and reorient traditional IR perspectives.
Place: The United States is the largest IBC exporter, with nearly 40 percent
(n¼ 83) of currently operating IBCs originating in that country (Cross-Border
Education Research Team 2015). However, while a majority of branch campuses
comes from the West, a number of countries in the rest of the world (e.g., China,
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Malaysia, and India) have also begun to export academic programs. Moreover,
IBCs have now been opened across all inhabitable continents, with significant
concentrations in Asia and Middle East. The data suggest, however, that IBCs
with IR programs have not followed this multidirectional flow. The IBCs listed in
Table 1 are those that indicated in the 2011 survey that they offered an
International Relations program (Lane and Kinser 2011). To Acharya’s point that
IR remains rooted in certain Western nations, Table 1 shows that IBCs offering IR
programs are exporting knowledge from the United Kingdom and the United
States.
The placement of these IBCs is much more diverse, with campuses in Europe,
the Middle East, Central America, and Asia. The more recently created IBCs,
namely those created by Georgetown University and the University of
Nottingham, were developed because they were recruited by the importing nation
and located in countries that saw a strategic importance in having a Western IBC
located within its borders. The location of the older IBCs were driven more by in-
stitutional interest in expanding abroad and alignment with other factors such as
cold war allies (Italy and Belgium), the world’s fastest growing economy (Japan),
and the significant US presence in Panama during the creation of the Canal.
What is not yet clear is whether the modern IBCs are replicas of the British
School in India that sought to replicate a wholly British institution in a foreign
country or if the IBCs serve as a potential opportunity for Western programs to
learn from other regions.
People: IBCs are developed largely to serve local and/or regional student popu-
lations (McBurnie and Ziguras 2007). At IBCs housing IR programs, the student
bodies are more international than those on the home campus and generally
comprised of two types of students: (1) those from the local region who want to
pursue a Western education, but are not able to do so often because of lack of re-
sources, cultural barriers, or visa restrictions and (2) those from the home country
looking to study abroad but in a familiar academic setting. Both student types
want an American style educational experience, expecting certain institutional de-
signs to be replicated. However, being at the IBC mitigates certain effects associ-
ated with the home campus no matter how much a home campus seeks to
replicate its structures. For students from the home country choosing to pursue
their education at an IBC, they are embedded in an institution with similar con-
tent and culture as to what they would have been exposed to in the home country;
but being embedded in the host country facilitates a greater awareness of the for-
eign country and its politics—even providing an opportunity for the student to as-
sess the extent to which their IR curriculum resonates with (or not) the local
political environment. For students from the host country, the IBC provides an
opportunity to pursue an “American” or “British” education, but they miss the re-
inforcement provided by being embedded in the American culture. Of particular
Table 1. International branch campuses with IR programs
Institutions Home country Host country Date founded
Boston University1 USA Belgium 1971
Florida State University USA Panama 1957
Georgetown University USA Qatar 2005
Johns Hopkins University USA Italy 1955
Johns Hopkins University USA China 1986
Temple University USA Japan 1982
University of Nottingham UK Malaysia 2000
University of Nottingham UK China 2004
1Boston University’s campus in Brussels closed its operations in early 2014, after more than forty years.
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interest to this forum are the students from the host country, many of whom likely
would not have otherwise had an opportunity to pursue an IR education from
a Western-based institution. Thus, these embassies of knowledge provide the op-
portunity to extend Western knowledge and ways of knowing, in an American-
style institutional structure, to students who would not otherwise have the
opportunity.
Faculty tend to be expatriate, traveling from outside of the host country to
teach at the IBC (Aiello and Clarke 2010). They also tend to fall into two groups:
(1) young faculty looking for a chance at adventure and/or entry into the aca-
demic career route and (2) senior faculty who see the IBC as the final stop on the
way to retirement. Moreover, in an effort to ensure that the new IBC recreates the
home campus ethos, the first wave of faculty and staff tend to be somehow con-
nected with the home campus (Wood 2011). In fact, for all of the campuses listed
in Table 1, a vast majority of the faculty remain connected to the home campus
or, at the very least, educated in a Western-based institution. Only in very rare cir-
cumstances did the IBC hire faculty educated locally.
Understanding the educational and professional background of the faculty is
important as faculty seek to replicate their own institutional experiences (Smith
2009), and IBC governance mechanisms reinforce these experiences (Kinser and
Lane 2014). For example, at Georgetown’s campus in Qatar, the faculty are told,
“practices of faculty governance and educational policy-making operational on
the main campus ordinarily govern faculty affairs at the [Qatar campus]”
(Georgetown University 2016). This example illustrates that the Sahibs of the
home campus still dominate over the Munshis of the IBC. An area of future re-
search is to examine the extent to which this sort of centralized control permeates
other IBC structures and how such control impacts the localized construction and
delivery of the intellectual components of IR.
Content: A key tension that exists in the development of IBCs is the extent to
which the curriculum is required to be the same as that offered on the home cam-
pus or allowed to adapt to the local environment. This tension has important im-
plications for whether an IBC is a mechanism to extend the domination of a
particular IR perspective or an agent for fostering growth in the IR field toward
more inclusive perspectives. For the programs listed in Table 1, evidence gathered
from campus websites reflects differing institutional intentions when it comes to
this tension. Some institutions seek to adapt to the local environment. GU in
Qatar’s strategic plan states, “deans work with faculty members to diversify curric-
ular offerings in relevant areas based on evolving needs of the region and our
geographical comparative advantage” (Georgetown University 2016). Differently,
“Florida State University (FSU)-Panama strictly adheres to the academic require-
ments of FSU. All classes follow the same description of those at the main cam-
pus” (Florida State University, Republic of Panama 2016). Despite the differing
philosophical orientations, one common characteristic is that the actual degree
requirements are the same at both the home and the branch campus. So, any lo-
cal adaptation is still constrained by the predetermined degree requirements.
But, despite the fact that any content changes must work against the institutional
design of the degree, it is not known the extent to which the delivery of the IR
program at an IBC may result in (un)intended adjustments to the home campus
curriculum. However, even given the explicit rules to extend the home campus
structure to dominate program design elsewhere, is it possible that the delivery of
the program in a foreign context could result in alterations to the design and de-
livery of degrees at the home institution?
Culture: There is also a broader exporting of academic culture and societal prac-
tices abroad. One of the most evident manifestations of the exporting of the aca-
demic curriculum is that for all but one of the IBCs in Table 1 the language of
instruction remains English despite the fact that most of them are located in
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countries where English is not the country’s official language. One could argue that
maintaining English as the primary language of instruction could be an extension
of linguistic imperialism in which the language is used as a means to exert domi-
nance and serve as a conduit to transfer other aspects of a culture (Phillipson 2010).
At their inception, IBCs are essentially start-up organizations that have no cul-
ture of their own. As such, the home campus employs several mechanisms to rec-
reate the home campus’s institutional ethos at the branch location, such as
standardized advising, academic policies and practices, hiring decisions, and ad-
ministrative arrangements (see Biersteker’s contribution to this forum for a dis-
cussion of how such activities influence IR as a field). The replication of the
academic culture and societal practices of the home campus serve to extend the
institutional dominance of the ways of thinking, teaching, and learning created
on the Western-based home campus and, in turn, reinforce the knowledge
deemed to be important. That said, it is not possible for any social organization to
not adapt to the local environment. Student handbooks are adapted to reflect the
local cultural mores and rule of law. And, the one noted exception to the English
language provision, the Johns Hopkins-Nanjing Center, requires that
“International students take most of their courses in Chinese taught by Chinese
faculty, while Chinese students are taught by international faculty with courses pri-
marily in English.” (Hopkins-Nanjing Center 2016). This last example evidences
the ability of IBCs to adapt content and academic culture to the local conditions
and raises hope that these embassies of knowledge may provide an opportunity to
push IR toward a more global set of perspectives. That said, the originating cul-
ture will always serve as a constraint that limits how IR evolves and changes. Just
how much of a constraint is a question for further research.
Conclusion
Taking the findings discussed above together, IBCs serve as embassies of knowl-
edge, projecting academic content and practices abroad. Given that the universi-
ties exporting IR programs are rooted in the United Kingdom and the United
States, this type of activity may extend the intellectual dominance of these pro-
grams in the IR field. At the same time, when we view these programs from a po-
litical sociology perspective, we must view the activities of the IBC in a
multilayered way. The extent to which IBCs propagate some ways of thinking and
learning about world politics is inscribed in existing economic, diplomatic/politi-
cal, and professional systems alike. Despite the clear implication that the home
campus remains dominant over the branch in terms of the extension of home in-
stitution structures, such as setting degree requirements and academic expecta-
tions, there was evidence that suggests that branch campuses are considering ways
to adapt their curriculum to the local environment, which could have long-term
implications for how world politics is taught and studied at both the home and
the host campus.
IBCs are important “physical” instruments for popularizing specific societies’ in-
ternational pedagogies in other places—”pedagogies” in a broad sense, including
as much content as culture—both being reinforced by the institutional structures
designed to protect and extend them. As the future of world politics is considered,
IBCs can be important sites for advancing understanding of how current pedago-
gies may evolve to reflect a more inclusive understanding of world politics—and ad-
vance a understanding of the extent to which structures can preserve IR from
outside influence. A critical question for further study is whether replicating a given
structure in a different geopolitical environment will result in the same IR program
or an altered version of the one offered on the home campus. Evidence suggests
that it is not possible to avoid some form of alternation, so the more poignant ques-
tion is how does institutional design mitigate or facilitate such alternations. In fact,
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IBCs should not be seen necessarily as only a one-way street of knowledge export-
ing—IBCs do in practice turn into hybrid forms of home-nation/host-nation insti-
tutions, to the point where they amalgamate (in place) knowledge from either
place, and local knowledge from “there” might eventually be channeled back to the
“home institution” via faculty and student circulation. IBCs, as a form of institu-
tional design, may eventually be an important tool for realizing Acharya’s call for
more global IR that reflects regional worlds but that would require elevating the
role of the Munshis relative to that of the Sahibs.
An Ethnographic Perspective on Educating
State Subjects in Russia
MARTIN MU¨LLER
University of Zu¨rich
In this contribution, I attempt a brief foray into better understanding how we are
to make sense of one concrete institution of IR education: the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations in Russia. As far as institutions of IR education
go, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, better known by its
Russian acronym MGIMO, is a curious one. Founded by the USSR People’s
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in 1944 as a response to the perceived need to
train cadres for the Soviet diplomatic service, it remained a secluded institution
during the Soviet period in at least two respects: Admission was highly selective
and the institute itself was shrouded in mystery. It was a government institution
that belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and students to occupy leading
positions in ministry. Communist ideology dominated the approach to teaching
IR, which was framed in Marxist-Leninist ideology as a class struggle between capi-
talist and socialist societies (Torkunov 2004).
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, MGIMO has undergone a major trans-
formation. It is still considered an elite school, but its mission has become much
broader. It has added new departments and degrees, branching out into business,
management, law, and economics, and, in 1994, it received the title of a “univer-
sity”—a fact that it is proud of, since it underscores the seriousness of its research
ambitions and helps it shed the image of merely being a service institution to pre-
pare staff for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this sense, MGIMO is a hybrid in-
stitution (as Hagmann and Lebedeva note in this forum), with an origin in
providing professional training for future diplomats and civil servants, but a re-
cent broadening of scope to become a university focused on the social sciences.
Indeed, the large majority of students who go through IR education at MGIMO
no longer end up in jobs in the field of diplomacy, and if they do, they usually
first attend an institute for dedicated professional training, such as the Russian
diplomatic academy. In that sense, MGIMO is quite distinct from professional
schools such as the Ecole de Guerre discussed in Balzacq’s piece.
In 2005 and 2006, I conducted a long-term ethnographic study at MGIMO,
where I systematically attended and analyzed lectures and seminars and inter-
viewed lecturers and students about their work and degree study. I was not just in-
terested in the knowledge taught, but more so in the practices of socialization
and education—in the education of subjects (Mu¨ller 2009,2011). While the what
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of IR education, the different approaches and curricula, has started to draw some
attention in recent time (e.g., Tickner and Wæver 2009; Hagmann and Biersteker
2014), this how, the institutional practices of producing knowledge and subjects,
have been much less prominent on the agenda of IR. I will focus on this “how” on
the following by moving from the macro to the meso and the micro level in three
steps, focusing first, on MGIMO’s role for the Russian state in its reproduction of
patriotic elites (macro), then second, on its role as an organization with a specific
set of practices for producing docile and self-governed subjects (meso), and fi-
nally, on its production of affective bodies in what could be called “neuropolitics.”
Reproducing the Russian State
The ways in which education establishes the link between the state and the indi-
vidual is crucial for an analysis of its role in shaping world order. How do individ-
uals come to legitimately act for and represent the state in specific ways—ways
that will be different in different countries?
One of MGIMO’s primary functions is to foster the link between the Russian
state and the individual student. There is a tight connection between patriotism
and professionalism at MGIMO (see Hoffman 2006 for a similar finding in
China). Students do not study at MGIMO to merely advance their own careers
and become professionals in their chosen fields. They are expected and indeed
keen to become patriotic citizens of their country. A new student at MGIMO, pic-
tured as a true future professional in smart attire and with a tie, thus states in an
interview for MGIMO that his role models are the great diplomats in Russian his-
tory, “Gorchakov, Witte, Gromyko, sincerely defending the interest of the father-
land [otechestvo] in the international sphere.” He underscores that his aim is “to
be of use for the motherland [rodina]” (MGIMO 2014).
To study at MGIMO is not to acquire knowledge for the sake of it, it is not l’art
pour l’art. It means to commit to serving Russia and comes with an implicit reciproc-
ity: The state takes the best of care of you and gives you the chance to study at
MGIMO, so you are expected to take the best of care of the state upon graduation.
Education at MGIMO is thus part and parcel of the reproduction of the Russian
state and its position and interests in the global world order. Through MGIMO, the
state becomes individualized, while the individuals become “statisfied,” as it were.
Making Docile and Self-Governed Subjects
Educational institutions do not just transmit knowledge. They also produce sub-
jects, both as a disciplinary institution, regulating routines and producing docile
bodies (Foucault 1979) and as an enabling institution, producing enterprizing
selves (Foucault 1991). For Foucault (1979, 170–94), there are three mechanisms
of discipline that are at work at educational institutions: hierarchical observation,
normalizing judgment, and the examination. Hierarchical observation is coercion
by means of observation—a calculated gaze rendering each student visible and
traceable. Normalizing judgment places students in an individualized ranking sys-
tem, which makes it possible to spot deviations from an assumed norm. The ex-
amination combines the techniques of hierarchical observation and normalizing
judgment: It makes each individual visible, assessable, and classifiable and thus
enables comparisons. What results from these mechanisms of discipline, accord-
ing to Foucault, are docile bodies that may be governed, transformed, and en-
hanced through schooling.
This disciplining is instantiated through numerous small practices at MGIMO.
Student life is highly regulated: Timetables impose a school-like order, studious
discipline is exhorted as a model to emulate, examinations structure the sched-
ule, and the small groups make it difficult for a student to hide. The regular
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examinations qualify and classify students. Their nature reproduces knowledge as
objective: Memorizing and reproducing facts and figures is appreciated—the
more, the better. Knowledge thus is not to be questioned; it is to be acquired and
put to use. This approach does not encourage questioning what is taught and
thus reinforces geopolitical worldviews—a predicament not unique to IR educa-
tion in Russia (see, e.g., Marks 2002; Tickner 2006).
While discipline is a coercive, hierarchical mechanism of making subjects of in-
dividuals, modern education also has a second set of mechanisms of making sub-
jects—technologies of the self or what Foucault (1991, 87–104) refers to as the
conduct of conduct (conduire des conduits in French). It encourages subjects to be-
come self-governed, internalizing regulation rather than being disciplined from
the outside. Such internalization is often linked to the emergence of neoliberal-
ism in advanced modern societies, which stresses individual freedom of choice
and economic calculation. Self-governed subjects understand and enact their lives
in terms of choice; they act so as to realize what they perceive as the pursuit of a
good life and successful career but at the same time incorporate market rationales
(Rose 1999, 15–97).
Students at MGIMO are just as much externally regulated through discipline as
they are self-governed subjects. The dream job and the envisioned career make
students strive for enhancing their market value, forming themselves according to
the demands of the job market. Students do, for the most part, not feel that they
are subjected to the ordeal of education by force of discipline, but that they do so
by their own choice in pursuit of a successful career and their individual life
choices. That is important for IR education, for it means that students internalize
by their own accord the knowledge taught at MGIMO—as a means of advancing
Russia and their own careers at the same time.
The Neuropolitics of Affective Bodies
Learning and education are typically thought of as highly rational activities: They
are about teaching, reproducing, and applying well-circumscribed approaches,
facts, and knowledge about world politics. Indeed, this focus on the curriculum—
the what of education—is how education has mostly been approached in IR (e.g.,
Hagmann and Biersteker 2014). But there is another, more passionate, more af-
fective side, to education, in particular where it concerns such emotionally
charged themes as one’s own country and its place in the world. Education inter-
venes in what William Connolly (2002, 34) calls neuropolitics: The mixing of af-
fective “gut feelings” that operate below the threshold of reflection into
perception, analytical thinking, and judgment.
IR education is a central element in this neuropolitics, as it can help create a
shared collective consciousness among students. It can retell histories of collective
humiliation, such as in the loss of territory to an enemy, or rage, for example, at
genocides. It can stoke pride of a nation’s war heroes or democratic credentials.
The classroom, thus, is an affective laboratory in which professors do not just re-
tell “the facts” or neutral theories, but imbue meaning with feelings that reverber-
ate throughout the densely packed bodies in the lecture hall. Certain political
situations may thus rather trigger deep-seated gut reactions than a process of cal-
culative reasoning.
Russia’s loss of great power status with the dissolution of the USSR and its quest
to regain it were evidence of how such neuropolitics was anchored at MGIMO.
Although the students I interviewed had not consciously lived through the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, many of them brought it up repeatedly as a traumatic
event. Gut feelings became palpable in the utter incomprehension, sometimes
even outrage, with which some students reacted when asked about the former
Soviet brother states breaking away in 1991. Otherwise articulate and suave, they
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started to scramble for words. They reproduce the separation of Ukraine from
Russia, for example, as a traumatic experience.
With this neuropolitical element in mind, it perhaps becomes easier to make
sense of Russia’s blitz annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine,
which even the most hawkish observers found hard to predict. It would, of course,
be too bold to claim that a better understanding of IR education in Russia could
have anticipated this move, but such an understanding makes it more plausible.
Not so much the outcome of extensive rational calculation and deliberation,
the coup in Crimea then becomes understandable as more of a gut reaction
linked to the affective potential of the loss of great power status and the necessity
to regain it.
Conclusion: From Know-What to Know-How
For a better understanding how IR education produces subjects and shapes the
practice of statecraft, there is a need to take in more than the codified knowledge
taught at schools and universities, whether these are syllabi or textbooks. As in
the case of MGIMO, IR education may turn students into state subjects, enabling
them to speak for and with the state. It trains them in external and internal regu-
lation and may instill in them not just knowledge but also affective dispositions.
That does not mean that knowledge is not important, but that we should take
greater care to examine the mechanisms that bring it to bear in certain situations
or subvert it in others. Or to put it in different terms: Instead of just focusing on
the know-what of IR, we should unpick its know-how.
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